The Katsuno and Mendelzon (KM) theory of belief update has been proposed as a reasonable model for revising beliefs about a changing world. However, the semantics of update relies on information which is not readily available. We describe an alternative semantical view of update in which observations are incorporated into a belief set by: a) explaining the observation in terms of a set of plausible events that might have caused that observation; and b) predicting further consequences of those explanations. We also allow the possibility of conditional explanations.
Introduction
Reasoning about action and change has been a central focus of research in AI for many years, dating at least to the origins of the situation calculus [20] . For example, a planning agent must be able to predict the effects of its actions on the world in order to verify whether a potential plan achieves a desired goal. Actions effect changes in the world, and agents must be able to modify their beliefs about the world to reflect such considerations. Furthermore, an agent situated in a dynamic world must be able to reason about changes in the world not simply due to its own actions, but due to the occurrence of exogenous events as well.
One of the most influential theories of belief change has been the AGM theory proposed by Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson [1] . Imagine an agent possesses a belief set or knowledge base KB. The AGM theory provides a set of postulates constraining the possible ways in which the agent can change KB in order to accommodate a new belief A. Notice that this revision of KB need not be straightforward, for the new belief A may conflict with beliefs in KB. It was pointed out by Winslett [27] that the AGM theory is inappropriate for reasoning about changes in belief due to the evolution of a changing world. A new form of belief change dubbed update was proposed in full generality by Katsuno and Mendelzon [16] , who provided a set of postulates, distinct from the AGM postulates, that characterize this type of belief change.
Semantically, Katsuno and Mendelzon have shown that belief update can be characterized by positing a family of orderings over possible worlds, with each ordering being indexed by some world.
The ordering associated with a specific world can be viewed intuitively as describing the most plausible ways in which that world can change. To update a knowledge base KB with some proposition A, the worlds admitted by KB are each updated by finding the most plausible change associated with that world satisfying A (we describe this formally below). As a concrete example, suppose that someone observes that the grass in front of her house is wet. She is not sure whether she left her book outside on the patio, but concludes that if the book is outside it is wet too. There are two possible worlds admitted by her knowledge, O and O (the book is outside or it is not). When the first possibility is updated with the observation of wet grass, a wet book is the result. When the second possibility is updated, the book remains dry. The conditional belief O W (the book is wet only if it was outside) is part of our agent's updated belief set.
In this paper, we present an abductive model of belief change suitable for updating beliefs in response to a changing world. While our semantics induces a class of belief change operators that is somewhat more general than Katsuno-Mendelzon (KM) update operators, the most compelling aspect of our model is the fact that it breaks the KM semantics into smaller, more primitive parts. We argue that such a model provides a more natural perspective on belief update in response to changes in the world, and exploits information that is more readily available or easily obtainable from users of a system. In the following, we use the term update to describe any process of belief change used to capture changes in belief due to change in the world (not simply those models conforming to the KM postulates).
In general, we take update to be a two stage process of explanation followed by prediction: first, an agent explains an observation by postulating some plausible event or events that could have caused that observation to hold, relative to its initial state of knowledge; second, an agent predicts the (further) consequences of these events, relative to this initial state. In our example, there are several possible causes of wet grass, among them the sprinkler turning on automatically, or rain. If rain is the most plausible of these causing events, our agent concludes that everything on the patio is wet, including the book if it is out there. Had sprinkler been the most plausible explanation, a different conclusion would have been reached: the book would be dry regardless of its location. It is these considerations that allow an agent to determine just what changes in the world are most plausible.
Intuitively, information about the effects of events, as well as their relative plausibility, will be more readily available or easier to assess than a direct ordering of plausibility over possible "evolutions" of the world.
We formalize this notion in an abstract manner obtaining a class of explanation-change operators that are similar in spirit and intent to KM update operators, but somewhat more general. We note that explanation has often been closely linked with belief revision [12] . Indeed, Boutilier and Becher [5] present a model of abduction where explanations are determined by explicit belief revision. Given this connection and the fact that update can be viewed as an essentially abductive process, we may also take update to be a certain kind of belief revision. This stands in stark contrast with the accepted wisdom that update and revision are orthogonal forms of belief change. While we could cast our model as a form of belief revision, this would detract from the main point of the paper. However, we do elaborate on this connection in the concluding section.
In Section 2 we review the KM postulates for belief update and the KM semantics. In Section 3 we analyze this semantics more closely, and break it into more basic elements. We describe our abductive view of update and show its relationship to the KM model. In particular, we show that certain semantic assumptions naturally give rise to the KM theory; however, we argue that these assumptions are inappropriate as general update principles. We also briefly describe and characterize a special class of update operators. In Section 4, we analyze our model more deeply and discuss the connections to belief revision. We also argue that proper modification of belief states in response to observations in dynamic settings involves a combination of belief revision and belief update. Finally, we compare our construction to the model of update proposed by del Val and Shoham [8] . Proofs of the main results can be found in the appendix.
The Semantics of Update
Katsuno and Mendelzon [16] have proposed a general characterization of belief update. Update is distinguished from belief revision conceptually by viewing update as reflecting belief change in response to changes in the world, whereas revision is thought to be more appropriate for changing (possibly erroneous) beliefs about a static world. Update is described by Katsuno and Mendelzon with a set of postulates constraining acceptable update operators and a possible worlds semantics, both of which we review here.
We assume the existence of some knowledge base KB, the set of beliefs held by an agent about the current state of the world. We take our underlying logic to be propositional, based on a finitely generated language L CPL . We use W to denote the set of possible worlds (or models) suitable for this language.
If some new fact A is observed in response to some (unspecified) change in the world (i.e., some action or event occurrence), then the formula KB A denotes the new belief set incorporating this change. The KM postulates [16] 
A better understanding of the mechanism underlying update can be achieved by considering the possible worlds semantics described by Katsuno and Mendelzon, which they show to be equivalent to the postulates. For any proposition A, let kAk denote the set of worlds satisfying A. Clearly, kKBk represents the set of possibilities we are prepared to accept as the actual state of affairs. Since observation O is the result of some change in the actual world, we ought to consider, for each possibility w 2 kKBk, the most plausible way (or ways) in which w might have changed in order to make O true. We will call such a change in any world an "evolution" of that world. To capture this intuition, Katsuno and Mendelzon postulate a family of preorders
where each w is a reflexive, transitive relation over W. We interpret each such relation as follows: if u w v then u is at least as plausible a change relative to w (or an evolution of w) as is v. Finally, a faithfulness condition is imposed: for every world w, the preorder w has w as a minimum element; that is, w < w v for all v 6 = w. Intuitively, this ensures that w is itself more plausible than any other evolution of w. thus, we can treat this as an appropriate semantics for the KM update theory.
As an example, consider the following scenario illustrating the application of the KM update semantics to database update. We know certain facts about an employee Fred: his salary is $40,000, his job classification is level N, and so on. But, we are unsure whether he works for the Purchasing department or the Finance department. Thus, our KB admits two possibilities, w and v, reflecting this uncertainty (see Figure 1) . If the orderings w and v are as indicated in the figure, then KB updated with the fact that Fred's salary is $50,000 contains, among other things, the facts Dept(P) _ Dept(F), Dept(P) Level(N) and Dept(F) Level(N+1). This is due to 1 Katsuno and Mendelzon use the term persistent to describe such orderings. 
While KB fOg entails Dept(P), and is captured semantically by the set fwg, KB O corresponds to the set fw; v 00 g and does not commit Fred to a particular department. The crucial distinction is update's willingness to consider the evolution of each possible world individually. Belief revision only considers the belief set KB as a whole.
Update as Explanation

Plausible Causes of Observations
The orderings upon which update semantics are based are interpreted as describing the most plausible manner in which a world might change. Given the role of update, this interpretation seems correct:
worlds closer to w in the ordering w are somehow more plausible states into which w might evolve.
It seems reasonable then to update a KB by considering those most plausible changes. In our example above, if Fred is in Purchasing (world w), then a change of salary of this type is more likely to come without a change in rank (w 0 ) than with a change in rank (w 00 ).
While reasonable, it begs the question: why would one change be judged more plausible than another? Intuitively, it seems that there are certain events or actions that would cause a change in w, and that those leading to w 0 are more plausible than those leading to w 00 . For example, the event RAISE might be more probable than the event PROMOTION (at least, in Purchasing).
Given an observation Sal(50000) -in this case an update transaction -an agent might come to believe Dept(P) Level(N) (as we have in our example) as follows: assuming Dept(P), the most plausible event that might cause such a change in salary is RAISE (rather than PROMOTION 3 While many events might explain O in this way, some will be more plausible than others, and it will be those the agent adopts. Given such an explanation, one may then proceed to predict further consequences of these events, and produce the set of beliefs arising from the observation.
With this point of view, the essence of update is captured by a two-step process: a) explanation of the observation in terms of some event(s); and b) prediction of the (additional) consequences of that event. We do not presume that the agent has direct knowledge of the event occurrence. If such direct knowledge is available the problem becomes much simpler, for the agent can simply predict the effects of this event using some theory of action. This is a very specific update problem, restricting an agent to updating by observations of the form "Event E occurred." No explanation is required. 4 Before formalizing this idea, it is important to realize that this perspective is very natural. It is reasonable to suppose that an agent (or builder of a KB) has ready access to some description of the preconditions and effects of the possible events in a given domain. This assumption underlies all work in classical planning and reasoning about action, ranging from STRIPS [10] to the situation calculus [20, 24] to more sophisticated probabilistic representations [18, 7] . With such information, the predictions associated with explanations (event occurrences) can be easily determined. Furthermore, an ordering over the relative likelihood of possible events also seems something which an agent or system designer or user might easily postulate. This should certainly be easier to construct than a direct ordering over worlds according to their likelihood of "occurring." Indeed, we will show that such an ordering over worlds is derivable from this more readily available information.
This provides a possible interpretation of the update process, and in our view, a very natural one. 5 Furthermore, as we describe in the concluding section (and in detail in [2] ), by breaking update into two components, we will be able to extend the type of reasoning about action one can perform in this setting.
Using explanation for reasoning about action has been proposed by a number of people, especially within the framework of the situation calculus. Work on temporal projection and prediction failures often exploits the notion of explanation. For instance, Morgenstern and Stein [21] propose a model where an observation that conflicts with the predicted effects of an agent's actions causes the agent to infer the existence of some external event occurrence. Shanahan [26] proposes a model with a similar motivation, but adopts a truly abductive model (where candidate events are hypothesized rather than deduced from an observation). Our model will be rather different in several ways. First, explanations will be conditional (i.e., explaining events are conditioned on certain propositions). Second, the criteria used for adopting explaining events will be based on the relative plausibility of events. Third, we will not limit attention to any particular model of action (such as the situation calculus). Finally, our goal is to show how explanation can account for the update of a knowledge base. We should point out that Reiter [25, and personal communication] has informally suggested that update can be viewed as explanation to events causing an observation. We will proceed to show that this is, in fact, the case.
A Formalization
To capture update in terms of explanation, we require two ingredients missing from the KatsunoMendelzon account: a set of events that cause changes, and an event ordering that reflects the relative plausibility of different event occurrences.
We assume a finitely generated propositional language with an associated set of worlds W. Let E be a finite event set, the elements of which are primitive events. In general, e 2 E is a mapping e : W ! 2 W . For w 2 W and e 2 E, we use e(w) to denote the result of event e occurring in world w. This is a set of worlds, each of which is a possible outcome of e occurring at w. An event with more than one possible outcome is nondeterministic. A deterministic event is any e 2 E such that e(w) is a singleton set for each w 2 W. A deterministic event set is an event set all of whose events are deterministic. We assume that events are total functions on the domain W, so that every event can be applied to each world. In addition, we insist that e(w) 6 = ; for each e; w. 6 We emphasize that not only are all possible outcomes of an event captured by the set e(w), but also that each world in e(w) is a legitimate, plausible outcome.
Typically, events are not specified as mappings of this type. Rather, for each event (or action), a list of conditions are provided that influence the outcome of the event. For each such condition, a set of effects is specified. An example of this is the classical situation calculus representation of actions (in the deterministic case). Another is the modified STRIPS representation presented in [18, 6] . The key feature of these, and other representations, is that each action/event induces a function between worlds (or worlds and sets of worlds). 7 Thus, most action representations will fit within this abstract model. While we do not delve into the representation of actions, our examples will suggest ways in which traditional representations can be augmented with the features of our model.
As a further generalization, if events are nondeterministic, we might suppose that the possible outcomes are ranked by probability or plausibility. We set aside this complication (but see [2] ).
In order to explain certain observations by appeal to plausible event occurrences, we need some metric for ranking explanations. We assume that the events in the set E are ranked by plausibility; hence, we postulate an indexed family of event orderings f w : w 2 Wg over E. We take e w f to mean that event e is at least as plausible (or likely to occur) as event f in world w. 8 We require that w be a preorder for each w, and will occasionally assume that w is a total preorder. Once again, we do not expect that this family of orderings will be presented explicitly.
Compact representation schemes are possible. For example, in our database example we might suppose that a user can specify the constraint that a RAISE event is more plausible than a PROMOTION event for employees of the Purchasing department. The relative plausibility need not be asserted explicitly for each world satisfying Dept(P).
We note that there are few restrictions on the relative plausibility of events in any given ordering w . The only structural basis for the logical comparison of events is through outcome sets, but these provide no logical constraints on relative plausibility. If we have two events e and f such that e(w) f(w), we impose no constraints on the relative ordering of e and f in w . In particular, we cannot insist that an event e with fewer possible outcomes be judged more likely than an event f.
For instance, imagine two events, flipping a coin and placing a coin, such that flipping results in two possible outcomes (heads, tails) and placing has three outcomes (heads, tails, edge). This provides no a priori reason to consider flipping or placing more likely than the other.
Putting these ingredients together, we have the following definitions:
Definition An event model is a triple hW; E; i, where W is a set of worlds, E is a set of events (mappings e : W ! 2 W ) and is an indexed family of events orderings f w : w 2 Wg (where each w is a preorder over E).
Definition A deterministic event model is an event model where every e 2 E is deterministic (i.e., for all w 2 W, e(w) = fvg for some v 2 W). A total order event model is an event model where each event ordering w is a total preorder over E.
Given an event model, an agent is able to incorporate a new piece of information through a process of explanation and prediction as discussed above. An explanation of an observation is some event e
that, when applied to the world under investigation, possibly causes O. However, the agent should be interested only in the most plausible such events.
Definition Let O be some proposition and w 2 W. The distinction between weak and predictive explanations is very similar to that made between consistency-based diagnosis [23] and predictive (or abductive) diagnosis [22] . This distinction is illustrated in Figure 2 . Note that if O is unexplainable relative to w, then Prog(wjO) = ;. This means that there is no event (among those specified in the model) that could have caused w to evolve into a world that satisfies O. The occurrence of O relative to w is impossible. We also note that if we are restrict our attention to predictive explanations, or to deterministic event models, we can rewrite this definition as Prog(wjO) = fe(w) : e 2 Expl P (O; w)g Taking a cue from the Katsuno-Mendelzon update semantics, the progression of a knowledge base KB given a particular observation O is obtained by considering all plausible evolutions of each world w 2 kKBk. However, if O is unexplainable for some w 2 kKBk, we take O to be unexplainable relative to KB as a whole.
Definition
The progression of KB given observation O is the set of worlds Prog(KBjO) = fP rog(wjO) : w 2 kKBkg If Prog(wjO) = ; for some w 2 kKBk, we let Prog(KBjO) = ;. The motivation for this last condition, that O must be explainable relative to every w 2 kKBk, comes from the KM update semantics itself. In the KM theory of update, the updated KB is constructed by considering the possible evolution of every possibility admitted by KB. We duplicate this intuition by considering the progression function of every world in kKBk. If no such evolution is possible for one of these worlds, we trivialize the result of updating KB. We might have allowed the progression of KB to be nontrivial even if some worlds could not evolve so as to satisfy O, and define Prog(KBjO) without this last condition. In other words, we might have considered Prog(KBjO) to be as in the definition, but simply accept, when Prog(wjO) = ;, that w contributes nothing to the construction of Prog(KBjO). However, we adopt the current approach for two reasons. First, our goal is to pursue the analogy with the KM update semantics. Our definition is a direct adaptation. Second, dropping this restriction has implications for the relationship between belief revision and update. Simply excluding worlds whose progression is empty is, in effect, performing revision in addition to update. While this is generally a good idea, the correct way to bring together revision and update requires more drastic changes in the way update is performed. We elaborate on this in Section 4.
We take progression of KB to be the semantic counterpart of the update of the theory KB. With such a progression function, we can now define the explanation-change operator relative to a given event model, which determines the consequences of adopting an observation.
The explanation-change operator induced by an event model EM is EM :
In our example, we have two event types, Promotion and Raise. A PROMOTION event (promotion of one level) ensures an employee's rank is increased and his salary is raised $10,000. Events RAISE(5) and RAISE(10) raise salary $5000 and $10,000, respectively. We assume the following event orderings for each department:
Purchasing: RAISE(10) PROMOTION RAISE (5) Finance: RAISE(5) PROMOTION RAISE (10) This is illustrated in Figure 3 , where shorter event arcs depict more plausible occurrences. The explanation relative to purchasing is a raise, while for finance it is a promotion. The updated KB 0 is determined by w 0 and v 00 and induces the beliefs described earlier.
As another example, imagine that a warehouse control agent expects a series of trucks to pickup and deliver certain shipments, but at time t1 an expected truck A has not arrived. Assume that this might be explained by snow on Route 1 or a breakdown. If snow is the most plausible of the two and subsequent predictions are crucial, for they will impact on the agent's decision regarding staffing, scheduling and so on. Notice also that such explanations are defeasible, which is reflected in the defeasibility of update: if A is late but B is on time, then snow is no longer plausible (therefore, e.g., D will not be delayed).
Finally, we can formalize our initial example. We first adopt a conditional STRIPS-like representation of events, using variables to schematically capture a set of propositions, and take each event specification to induce the obvious transformation on possible worlds (see, e.g., [18, 6] Note that had it not been overcast, SPRINKLER would have been the most plausible explanation and our agent would rest assured that her book is dry.
We should remark at this point that the intent of this model is to provide an abductive semantic model for update, not a computational model. Just as we do not expect actions or events to be represented as abstract functions between worlds, explanations will not typically be generated on a world by world basis. Usually, the same event will explain an observation for a large subset of the worlds within kKBk. In particular, we expect that kKBk to be partitioned according to some small number of propositions (or conditions) for which a certain event is deemed to be a reasonable explanation. Indeed, these can naturally be viewed as conditional explanations, for example, "If Fred is in Finance, a PROMOTION must have occurred; but otherwise a RAISE must have occurred."
How such conditional explanations should be generated will be intimately tied to the action or event representation chosen, and is beyond the scope of this paper.
Relationship to The Katsuno-Mendelzon Theory
We are interested in the question of whether the explanation-change operator satisfies the KM update postulates. This is not the case given the formulation above.
Proposition 3 Let EM be the explanation-change operator induced by some event model. Then
EM satisfies postulates (U1), (U4), (U6) and (U7).
There are two reasons why the remainder of the postulates are not satisfied in general, hence two assumptions that can be made to ensure that EM is an update operator.
The first difference in the explanation-change operator is reflected in the failure of (U2), which asserts that KB A is equivalent to KB whenever KB entails A. A simple example illustrates why this cannot be the case is general. Consider a KB satisfied by a single world w where w j = A. Postulate (U2) requires that the observation of A induce no change in KB. However, it may be that the most plausible event in the ordering w is e, where e(w) = fvg for some distinct world v. But assuming v j = A, then KB EM A is captured by v and is thus distinct from w. In order to conform to postulate (U2), we must make the assumption that no change in w is more plausible than change induced by some event. Formally, we postulate null events and make these most plausible.
Definition
The null event is an event n, where n(w) = fwg for all w 2 W.
Definition Let EM = hW; E; i be an event model. EM is centered iff the null event n 2 E and, for each w 2 W and e 2 E (e 6 = n) we have n w e.
Thus, a centered event model is one in which the null event is the most plausible event that could occur at any world. This seems to be the crucial assumption underlying postulate (U2).
Proposition 4 Let EM be the explanation-change operator induced by some centered event model. Then EM satisfies postulates (U1), (U2), (U4), (U6) and (U7).
This assumption of persistence of the truth of KB seems to be reasonable in many domains, but should probably be called into question as a general principle. It may be the case in a domain where change is the norm that, despite the fact that an observation is already believed, some change in KB should be forthcoming. As an example, consider an agent monitoring a control system producing some product. It observes a display that indicates whether the system is proceeding normally. If it believes that a normal condition is displayed before the next observation, observing that the display (still)
indicates normal should not require that its other beliefs not change: it may, for instance, update the number of units produced in response to this observation. In this sense, the more general nature of the explanation-change operator may be desirable.
Postulate (U3) is also violated by our model, and for a similar reason, so too are (U5) and (U8). This condition is sufficient to ensure (U5) and (U8) are satisfied as well.
Proposition 6
Let EM be the explanation-change operator induced by some complete event model.
Then EM satisfies postulates (U1), (U3), (U4), (U5), (U6), (U7) and (U8).
The completeness of an event model refers, in fact, to the completeness of its event set E. If this set is rich enough to ensure that, for every world and observation, some event can make that observation hold, then the event model will be complete. Typically, domains will not be so wellbehaved. However, the simple addition of a miracle event to an event set will ensure completeness.
Intuitively, a miracle is some event which is less plausible than all others and whose consequences are entirely unknown. If all observations must be explainable, and no observation is permitted to force an agent into inconsistency, then miracles are one embodiment of the required assumptions. The reasonableness of such a requirement can be called into question, however. Having unexplainable observations is, in general, a natural state of affairs. Rather than relying on miraculous explanations, the threat of an inconsistency can force an agent to reconsider the observation, its theory of the world, or both. As we will see in the concluding section, it is just this type of inconsistency that can force an agent to revise its beliefs about the world prior to the observation. Update postulate (U3) makes it difficult to combine update with revision in this way.
If we put together Propositions 4 and 6, we obtain the main representation result for explanationchange.
Theorem 8 Let EM be the explanation-change operator induced by some complete, centered event model. Then EM satisfies update postulates (U1) through (U8).
A useful perspective on the relationship between explanation change and update comes to light when one considers that the plausibility ordering on events quite naturally induces an indexed family of preorders of the type required in the Katsuno-Mendelzon update semantics. Intuitively, the more plausible some causing event e v for world v is (relative to w), the more plausible evolution v of world w is deemed to be (according to w ). We note that if the event model is not centered then the generated preorder is not necessarily faithful.
Theorem 9 Let
If the model is not complete, then we have only a restricted form of faithfulness. It will be the case that w < w v for any world v that is a possible evolution of w (i.e., if v 2 e(w) for some e 2 E). However, those worlds that cannot result from the application of some event to w will be unrelated to w. In this case, we can say that w is faithful relative to the connected component of w that includes w. Intuitively, we want to ignore those worlds that are not "reachable" from w. To do this we can simply define an update operator using the relation w restricted to such worlds:
fv : v 2 e(w) for some e 2 Eg
This ensures that unrelated worlds are not trivially minimal in the ordering relation w .
If we have an event model where each event ordering is a total preorder, then the induced plausibility orderings over worlds are also total preorders.
Proposition 10
Let EM = hW; E; i be a complete event model such that w is a total preorder for each w 2 W. Then each plausibility ordering w induced by EM is a total preorder.
The circumstance where a set of events is totally preordered by plausibility may arise rather frequently;
for instance, events may be ranked according to some integer scale, or assigned some qualitative probability ranking. Therefore, the properties of such total update operators are of interest. We can extend the Katsuno-Mendelzon representation theorem to deal with update operators of this type.
The required postulate embodies a variant of the principle of rational monotonicity, cited widely in connection with nonmonotonic systems of inference and conditional logics (see, e.g., [3, 19] ).
(U9) If KB is complete, (KB A) 6 j = :B and (KB A) j = C then (KB (A^B)) j = C
Theorem 11 An update operator satisfies postulates (U1) through (U9) iff there exists an appro-
priate family of faithful total preorders f w : w 2 Wg that induces (in the usual way).
Corollary 12
Let EM be the explanation-change operator induced by some total order event model.
Then EM satisfies postulate (U9).
Indeed, Katsuno and Mendelzon [16] also discuss the possibility of totally ordered plausibility rankings and provide a postulate (U9) related to the one above, and the proof of equivalence is similar to that suggested by them (see also their work on total orders for belief revision [17] ).
As a final remark, we note that the converses of Theorems 8 and 9 are trivially and uninterestingly true. For any update operator , one can construct an appropriate set of events (and orderings) that will induce that operator. This not of interest, since the point of explanation-change is to provide a natural view of update, characterizable in terms of the events of an existing domain. The ability to construct such events to capture a particular update operator provides little insight into update. The appropriate perspective is to reject any update operator (in a given domain) that cannot be induced by the existing set of events (or event model).
Concluding Remarks
We have provided an abductive model for incorporating into an existing belief set observations that arise through the evolution of the world. While our model allows more general forms of change than KM update, we can impose restrictions on our model to recover precisely the KM theory. However, these restrictions are inappropriate in many cases, calling into question the suitability of some of the update postulates.
Relationship to Belief Revision
It has frequently been suggested that abduction can be modeled by appeal to belief revision [12] .
Boutilier and Becher [5] present a model of abduction along these lines, whereby an explanation for an observation O, with respect to some KB, is a sentence E such that KB E entails O. In other words, had an agent believed the explanation E it would have believed the observation O.
The abductive view of update suggests that update may also be viewed as a form of belief revision.
Since explanations take the form of event occurrences, an interpretation using belief revision takes update to be the process of an agent revising its beliefs about whether an event occurred and just what that event was. For instance, in our main example the observation Sal(50000) can be viewed as causing an agent to give up its belief that no event has occurred (i.e., the world has not changed) and accept the fact that something has happened -in particular, it accepts the belief
Dept(P) Occurred(RAISE(10))^Dept(F) Occurred(PROMOTION)
Of course, we have not provided an explicit logical language for the representation of actions or events, and in particular, have not provided a method for revising beliefs about such occurrences.
However, there are a number of ways to model this type of belief revision, including using histories or runs of a system as our basic semantic objects. A run is essentially a sequence of world states capturing a particular evolution of a system. Using these as semantic primitives one can capture beliefs about the actual state of the world in addition to event occurrences. While not directly suited to our task, the revision model of Friedman and Halpern [11] , in which runs are ranked in manner suitable for belief revision, is precisely the type of system upon which a more elaborate model of update, revision and explanation can be built.
When viewed in this way, certain problems with the update model, as formulated by Katsuno and Mendelzon and recast here, become apparent. The types of explanations one is willing to consider are restricted to event occurrences. In other words, an agent is bound to revise its beliefs only about possible event occurrences and their consequences. Thus, an agent making an observation is not allowed to entertain the possibility that its knowledge base KB was incomplete or incorrect. It can only change its beliefs about the post-event world state. Semantically, this restriction is apparent in our definition of update (as well as Katsuno and Mendelzon's). We require that every w 2 kKBk be progressed according to likely explaining events.
It is just this restriction that calls into question the suitability of update as a "stand-alone" belief change operator. Of particular concern, as emphasized earlier, is postulate (U3). This embodies the assumption that all observations are explainable in terms of some event. This is not always reasonable.
For instance, in our database example we might have a transaction to update Fred's salary to $90,000
when there is a salary cap of $80,000 in Finance. Thus, no event could have caused this salary change if Fred is indeed in Finance. Far from being a miraculous occurrence, it suggests that Fred in actually in Purchasing. Thus the observation not only forces KB to be updated (reflecting a change in the world), but also revised (reflecting additional knowledge about the world).
Note that this is not an artifact of out definition of update, One might argue that we should simply update those worlds for which explanations exist and ignore the others. This minor adjustment seems reasonable, but it is no longer simply update. Rather it is a combination of update and revision.
Furthermore observations may often be unexplainable for every world in kKBk. For instance, suppose a solution is believed to be an acid, when a litmus strip is dipped into it and promptly turns blue. This is not explainable for any KB-world (it should turn red) in terms of event effects. As such, the minor adjustment of our definition of update is not sufficient. We may want to update KB consistently in circumstances where no possible event could give rise to the observation given our current state of belief. Instead, the intuitive explanation in this example consists of two parts: the first postulates that the event of dipping the paper in the solution occurred; the second suggests that the solution is in fact a base. This requires revision of KB -we must change our beliefs about the pre-event state of the world in order to modify KB correctly.
Finally notice that an observation need not be strictly unexplainable to force revision. Often an implausible explanation will suffice. For instance, a raise to $90,000 might not be impossible in
Finance, but just so implausible that the database is willing to accept the fact that Fred is in Purchasing.
To adequately reflect such considerations, we must have the ability to compare the plausibility of event occurrences with the plausibility of beliefs about the world state. This provides further support for more expressive models and languages in which event occurrences can be reasoned with explicitly.
Issues of this sort make postulate (U3) (and certain aspects of (U5) and (U8)) somewhat questionable, and provides motivation for adopting an abductive view of update. This perspective is especially fruitful when combining the process of update (changing knowledge) with belief revision (gaining knowledge). A model that puts both components together in a broader abductive framework is described in [2] . Roughly, the logic for belief revision set forth in [4] is used to capture the revision process, but is combined with elements of dynamic logic [14] to capture the evolution of the world due to action occurrences.
Related Work
Other have presented models of update that, like ours and unlike the KM-model, have their basis in reasoning about action. del Val and Shoham [8, 9] mechanism for explaining an observation using the specification of existing actions. In order to deal with arbitrary observations an action is "invented" for the purpose of causing any observation in any situation. Naturally, the effects of such new actions are not specified a priori in the domain theory.
So they propose that the effect of invented actions is to induce minimal change in the knowledge base according to some persistence mechanism. However, the plausible cause of an observation O may carry with it, in general, other drastic (rather than minimal) changes in KB. This can only be accounted for by explaining an observation in terms of existing actions. A persistence mechanism is required primarily because existing action or event specifications are not employed.
Another drawback of this model is its failure to account for the possibility that any of a number of actions might have caused O, and that update should reflect the most plausible of these causes.
Finally, there is an assumption that the update of KB is due to the occurrence of a (known) single action. As we have described above, this will usually not be the case. Conditional explanations, explanations that use different actions for different "segments" of KB, will be very common.
A related mechanism is proposed by Goldszmidt and Pearl [13] , who use qualitative causal networks to represent an action theory. Again, update formula are implicitly assumed to be propositions asserting the occurrence of some action or event. An observation O is incorporated by assuming some proposition do(O) has become true, and using a forced-action semantics to propagate its effects.
Explanations are not given in terms of existing actions.
We should point out that both proposals adopt a theory of action that provides a representation mechanism for actions and effects, as well as incorporating a solution to the frame problem (implicitly in the case of Goldszmidt and Pearl). We have side-stepped such issues by focusing on the semantics of update. We are currently investigating various action representations, such as STRIPS and the situation calculus, and the means they provide for generating conditional explanations. This is partially developed in [2] , where we provide a representation for actions using a conditional default logic to capture the defeasibility and nondeterminism of action effects, and use elements of dynamic logic to capture the evolution of the world. Action theories such as those exploited in [8, 13] Proof Let w be some world in a complete, centered event model EM = hW; E; i, and let w be an induced ordering.
(a) That w is reflexive and transitive follows immediately from the definition w in terms of the event ordering w and the fact that w is itself reflexive and transitive.
Hence w is a preorder. Since null action n w e for all e 6 = n and n(w) = fwg, we have w w v for all v 6 = w (if v 2 e v (w) for some event e v ). Thus w is faithful. Finally, since EM is complete, for any v there is some e v such that v 2 e v (w). Proof We first assume a suitable family of preorders. The representation result of Katsuno and Mendelzon ensures that the induced update operator satisfies (U1) through (U8). We now show that it also satisfies (U9). LetKB be complete with kKBk = fwg. Suppose KB A 6 j = :B and KB A j = C. Let min(A) denote the set min w fv : v j = Ag. Then we have min(A) kC k and min(A) \ kBk 6 = ;. Since w is a total preorder, min(A^B) min(A) \ kBk kC k so KB (A^B) j = C. Therefore (U9) is satisfied.
Now we suppose satisfies postulates (U1) through (U9). To prove that a suitable family of orderings exist, we adopt the basic technique of Katsuno and Mendelzon [15] . However, the orderings are constructed in a rather different fashion to ensure that the preorders are total. As preliminary notation, for any set of worlds X, we write X to denote some sentence such that k X k = X. To emphasize that this will be the object of revision, we write KB fwg instead of fwg . We note that (U1) and (U3) ensure that KB fwg X X 0 for some X 0 X. We will also make use of the fact that X 0 j = X for any X 0 X. We can now define a family of ordering relations based on as follows: v w u iff v 2 kKB fwg fv;ug k
We first show that w is a faithful persistent preorder. Clearly, w is reflexive, since (U1) and (U3) ensure that v 2 kKB fwg fvg k. Similarly, at least one of v or u is in kKB fwg fv;ug k, so either v w u or u w v. It is easy to verify that w is faithful and persistent due to (U2) and (U3). It simply remains to verify that w is transitive. So suppose v w u and u w t. This ensures that v 2 kKB fwg fv;ug k and u 2 kKB fwg fu;tg k. 
